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"SCHOOL'S CLOSED!"
Schoolchildren's fantasy almost becomes stark reality
for undocumented Mexican immigrants.
Edward P. Yankelunas
In the October term of this past year, the United States Su-
preme Court heard arguments on a consolidated appeal
from decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. Those cases, Plyler v. Doe and In Re:
Alien Children Litigation, raise a difficult question of con-
stitutional significance: whether the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to illegal aliens.
Texas, like other border states, is currently confronted
with a large increase of illegal aliens residing within its
borders and has responded with legislation which had the
practical effect of excluding undocumented Mexican
children from its free public schools.
The Texas statute, Section 21.031 of the Texas Educa-
tion Code, was purportedly designed to employ public edu-
cation funds to provide an education to United States
citizens and legally admitted aliens. It provides that:
(a) All children who are citizens of the United States
or legally admitted aliens who are over the age of five
years and under the age of twenty-one years on the
first day of September of any scholastic year shall be
entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund
for that year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the
United States or a legally admitted alien who is over
the age of five years and not over the age of twenty-
one years on the first day of September of the year in
which admission is sought shall be permitted to at-
tend the public free schools of the district in which he
resides or in which his parent, guardian, or person
having lawful control of him resides at the time he ap-
plies for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school
district of this state shall admit into the public free
schools of the district free of tuition all persons who
are either citizens of the United States or legally ad-
mitted aliens who are over five and not over twenty-
one years of age at the beginning of the scholastic
year if such person or his parent, guardian, or person
having lawful control resides within the school dis-
trict.
The Tyler Independent School District (ISD) is a public
school district which receives some federal funding in addi-
tion to state and local funds. James Plyler is the Super-
intendent of the Tyler ISD. Even though Section 21.031
was in force as of 1975, Tyler ISD continued to enroll un-
documented Mexican children free of tuition until the
1977-1978 academic year. However, fearing that Tyler
ISD would become a haven for illegal aliens, the Board of
P/ 6qtV*L-
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Trustees for Tyler ISD promulgated the following policy in
July 1977 regarding the financing and control of education
for illegally admitted aliens:
The Tyler Independent School District shall enroll all
qualified students who are citizens of the United
States or legally admitted aliens, and who are resi-
dents of this school district, free of tuition charge. Ille-
gal alien children may enroll and attend schools in the
Tyler Independent School District by payment of the full
tuition free. [emphasis added]
Consistent with this policy, the Administrative Office
of the Tyler ISD conducted an educational expense analysis
and determined that tuition for children who are neither
United States citizens, legally admitted aliens, nor illegal
aliens in the process of being documented should be set at
$1,000 per year. That figure is supposed to reflect the year-
ly cost of educating a single child who resides in the Tyler
ISD.
After implementing this policy, school officials informed
the parents of the undocumented children that their chil-
dren could not attend school unless tuition was paid or the
proper documents were produced indicating that the child
was being processed with the INS for lawful admission into
this country. Due to their poverty, none of the parents of
the undocumented children involved in Plyler were able to
pay the $1,000 tuition fee. The undocumented Mexican
children, represented by their parents, brought an action
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the Declaratory
Judgment Act challenging the constitutionality of Section
21.031 of the Texas Education Code. Specifically, their
complaint alleged that the Texas statute, as implemented
by the Tyler ISD policy, denied them the equal protection
of the laws and, further, that the statute was preempted by
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §1101 et
seq.). The matter was heard in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division.
The essential question that needed to be addressed by
the district court, and subsequently by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit, was whether the Mexican chil-
dren who are residing in the Tyler ISD illegally are "'per-
sons" within the meaning of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. That Amendment provides,"
in pertinent part, that:
No State shall enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without d.ie process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws. [emphasis added]
After a trial on the merits, the district court held that
the application of Section 21.031 to undocumented alien
children violated the equal protection clause. Accordingly,
the Tyler ISD was permanently enjoined from excluding
the undocumented Mexican children from the public
schools pursuant to that statute. The foundation of the dis,
trict court's analysis was the finding that the operation of
the equal protection clause extended to illegal aliens (458
F.Supp. 569 [E.D. Tex. 1978]).
In the district court's view, those who fit within the
narrowed language are people that have entered the United
States by whatever means inasmuch as they are within the
territory of the United States and subject to its laws. Recogniz-
ing that the Texas Statute was subject to an equal protec-
tion analysis, the court proceeded to test the fairness of the
legislative classification contained in Section 21.031. Ab-
sent a fundamental right or suspect classification, a law
need only be supported by a rational basis.
In Plyler, the court preferred to avoid having "to re-
solve.., the difficult conceptual problems posed by the
two-tiered test"; it skirted the issue by ruling that, even if
an argument could not be formulated to demonstrate that
strict scrutiny was appropriate, a rational basis for the law
had not been shown. In sum, the court found that the
determination made by the Texas legislature to use funds to
educate United States citizens and legally admitted aliens
was not a rational basis for the challenged statute. Nor did
the state's adoption of a federal criterion-illegality of pres-
ence-provide a rational basis for the differential treatment
by Texas.
Of less significance was the finding of the district court
that the Texas statute was preempted by federal law-that
is, that it burdened or conflicted with any federal law or
treaty. The court reasoned that the challenged law defeat-
ed the clear implications of federal laws covering both illegal
aliens and education of disadvantaged children. Thus, the
Texas statute was deemed preempted by federal law.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the application of
Section 21.031 to undocumented children violated the
equal protection clause (628 F.2d 448 [1980]). However,
the conclusion of the district court that the Texas law in-
fringed upon an area preempted by federal law was re-
versed. The court of appeals agreed with the district court
that the preemption issue was governed by DeCanas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). However, that case provides
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that "not every state enactment which in any way deals
with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se
preempted by [the federal government's]... constitutional
power... [in that area] .. ." After reviewing the federal
legislative policy that the district court found to be ob-
structed by the Texas statute, the court of appeals rea-
soned that the perceived conflicts were illusory and con-
cluded:
Indeed, Congress may have intended to ensure a free
public education to all children within the United
States. But we find no evidence that this was the ex-
press or implied intent of Congress, and in the ab-
sence of such intent we are "enjoinfed from] seeking
our conflicts between state and federal regulation
where none clearly exists."
With respect to the equal protection issue, the court
agreed with the district court that the jurisdictional predi-
cate of the equal protection clause was dispositive. Essen-
tially, the jurisdictional predicate the court speaks of pro-
vides that all persons, including illegal aliens, who are
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States are
entitled to the equal protection guarantees. Moreover, the
court noted that, while due process rights do not extend to
an alien denied entry, those protections attach as soon as
the alien enters the United States, even when such entry is
illegal. Accordingly, the court reasoned, by analogy to the
jurisdfctional predicate of the equal protection clause, that
undocumented alien children are entitled to the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
In deciding which standard of review to apply to the
Texas statute, the court of appeals maintained that strict
scrutiny might be appropriate for various reasons. The
court then avoided the problem of formulating a convincing
argument by saying that "... . we need not dwell on that
difficult decision because we find that Section 21.031 is
constitutionally infirm regardless of whether it is tested us-
ing the mere rational basis standard or some more stringent
test.'"
A major justification for Section 21.031 offered by
Texas was that undocumented children had to be excluded
from its free public schools in order to avoid increasing the
total cost of education. Such a measure was purportedly
taken to protect the education of documented aliens and
United States citizens. However, the court refused to ac-
cept such "economic phraseology" as justification for the
total exclusion the challenged statute created:
We think it clear that a state's desire to save money
cannot be the basis of the total exclusion from public
On June 15, 1982, the Supreme Court decided the case of
Plyler v. Doe (50 U.S.L.W. 4650). The Court ruled that the
Texas statute barring illegal immigrant children from public
schools violated the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The author of this article expressed
both surprise at and satisfaction with the result reached by
the Court. We share his reaction to the decision.
A reading of the opinion reveals that Mr. Yankelunas
was correct in observing that the Court would not likely ex-
pand the definitions of "suspect classification" and "fun-
damental rights" in order to give the illegal immigrant chil-
dren's right to public education constitutional protection.
Unforeseen, however, was the Court's strong commitment
to the educational rights of the immigrant children. The jus-
tices reached their desired result, however, without making
a traditional equal protection finding that there was a.
suspect classification or fundamental interest at stake. The
Court was apparently reluctant to render any decision that
would open up a floodgate of constitutional claims by un-
documented immigrants or by children receiving inferior and
underfunded educations.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, invoked the
equal protection clause based upon the "irrationality" of the
law. He reasoned that the law failed to comport with federal
immigration policy, that the United States has available
remedies such as deportation with which to combat illegal
immigration, and that the Texas law "imposes a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for
their disabling status."
After finding that Texas's economic interests in enforc-
ing the law were not compelling, the Court concluded that
the law's irrationality outweighed any other considerations
and it declared the law unenforceable under the Constitu-
tion. -The Editors
schools of a group of persons who are entitled to the
equal protection of the laws of Texas and who share
similar characteristics with other children.
The final justification offered by Texas was that the
denial of education to undocumented children will lessen
the incentive for aliens to enter the United States illegally.
However, the court took notice of the fact that, since only a
small percentage of illegal aliens bring their children into
this country, Section 21.031 is aimed at only a small part of
the illegal immigration problem. Moreover, Texas has failed
to enact a statute prohibiting employers from hiring illegal
aliens. Such a measure, the court observed, would do much
more to lessen the incentive to immigrate illegally. Based on
these observations, the court concluded that "Section
FALL 1982
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"For the Supreme Court to decide
that illegal aliens in Texas are not
persons within the equal protection
clause would be putting form above
substance....
21.031 is an ineffectual means of discouraging illegal immi-
gration" and that the "[challenged] statute is not rationally
related to its asserted goal."
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's order enjoining the Tyler ISD from applying Section
21.031 to exclude undocumented Mexican children from
the public schools.
PLYLER V. DOE:
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE
AT THE SUPREME COURT
The United States Supreme Court agreed to decide the
equal protection issue on May 4, 1981, and arguments
were heard by the Court during the October Term.
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
question of whether the equal protection clause applies to
illegal aliens. However, Plyler brings this issue squarely
before the Court. The questions presented, as put forth in
the School District's brief, are:
1. Whether aliens unlawfully present in the United
States are "persons within a state's jurisdiction" as
that phrase is used in the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment; and
2. Whether a state is obligated to provide a tuition-
free public education to children unlawfully present
in the United States.
The resolution of the second question presented will
depend on how the Court answers the first.Justice Powell's
opinion in Certain Named and Unnamed Noncitizen Chil-
dren and Their Parents v. State of Texas, 49 U.S.L.W. 3133
(Powell, Circuit Justice 1980), illustrates the significance
the Court attaches to the equal protection issue. Ruling, in
his capacity as a circuit justice, that the undocumented
children should be admitted to the Texas schools pending
appeal of the district court's decision in In Re: Alien
Children Litigation to the Fifth Circuit, Justice Powell
wrote:
fTJhis is the exceptional case where it appears, even
before a decision by the Court of Appeals, that there
is a reasonable probability that this Court will grant
certiorari or note probable jurisdiction. The district
court's holding that the equal protection clause ap-
plies to unlawful aliens raises a difficult question of
constitutional significance .... The decision of the
Court of Appeals may resolve satisfactorily the im-
mediate question. But the overarching question of
the application of the equal protection clause to un-
lawful aliens appears likely to remain.
Recent decisions of the Burger Court, which upheld
state laws excluding resident aliens from certain state jobs,
are indicative of the current Court's reluctance to broaden
the categories of fundamental interests and suspect classi,
fications. In light of the current outlook of the Court with
respect to equal protection and the rights of aliens, it ap-
pears rather unlikely that the Court will suddenly reverse
its direction and apply the equal protection clause to illegal
aliens.
The determinative factor in the Court's analysis will
most likely be the unlawful nature of the undocumented
children's presence in Texas. The Fifth Circuit noted in Boe
v. Wright, 648 F. 2d at 437, that the Supreme Court has
utilized
consistent and careful language indicating that the
term "'person" as used in the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment "encompasses lawfully
admitted aliens as well as citizens.. ." Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. at 371 [emphasis added)...
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S.
410 (1948) ("ft~he Fourteenth Amendment em-
bodties] a general policy that all persons lawfully in
this country shall abide in any state on an equality of
legal privileges with all citizens under nondiscrimina
tory laws").... Therefore, it is conceivable that the
Supreme Court might conclude for policy reasons
that an alien, who is not lawfully residing in this
country, does not constitute a "person" within [a
state's) jurisdiction and, therefore, is not entitled to
the equal protection of the laws.
The language of Graham and Takahashi arguably limits
the applicability of the equal protection clause to persons
who are lawfully within a state's jurisdiction. It would be
difficult to assert that language regarding legality of pres-
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ence has no bearing on the jurisdictional predicate of the
equal protection clause. Moreover, in Leng May Ma v.
Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958), the Court found that an alien
who had been in the country illegally for one and one-half
years was not "within the United States" under the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act. The court of appeals in Plyler
distinguished Leng May Ma on the basis that the latter
hinged on presence within the United States and that juris-
-diction of the United States or of any state was not at
issue. However, the Supreme Court may find the limiting
language of the equal protection clause-"within its juris-
diction"-is more restrictive than the words "within the
United States." If that is the case, it appears unlikely that
illegal aliens can come within the more narrow language if
they cannot avail themselves of the more sweeping Ian-
guage of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §
1253(h)). It may be that Leng May Ma cannot be distin-
guished merely because that case dealt with presence be-
cause presence itself is an integral part of jurisdiction. If
that case is not distinguished by the Supreme Court on that
basis,.or for the reason that it involved statutory interpreta-
tion, it may have a significant impact on the resolution of
the equal protection issue in Plyler. Arguably, if an illegal
entrant is not deemed "within the United States," he is not
a person within a state's jurisdiction.
Another reason why the Court may find that illegal
aliens fall outside of the equal protection clause, may be the
preemption of a state's jurisdiction by federal immigration
law. The notion of jurisdiction presupposes a state's power
over a person. However, it might be said that states don't
have power to act on illegal aliens inasmuch as the field of
immigration is preempted. Clearly it would be a violation of
the supremacy clause for a state to deport illegal aliens
within its boundaries. The argument could be taken to the
extreme by a result-oriented member of the Court by asser-
ting that, where a state's jurisdiction is impaired relative to
an alien, that alien is not within a state's jurisdiction.
An analogy could be drawn to Blake v. McClung, 172
U.S. 239 (1889), where the Court, faced with an equal pro-
tection argument, found that a Virginia corporation was
not a person within the jurisdiction of Tennessee. The
Court found that the equal protection clause:
manifestly relates only to the denial by the State of
equal protection to persons "within" its "jurisdic-
tion." Observe, that the prohibition against the dep-
rivation of property without due process of law is not
qualified by the words "within its jurisdiction."...
The court cannot assume that those words were in-
serted without any object, nor is it at liberty to elimi-
nate them from the Constitution and to interpret the
clause in question as if they were not to be found in
that instrument .... [it is safe to say that a corpora
tion not created by Tennessee, nor doing business
there under conditions that subjected it to process
... is not, under the above clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, within the jurisdiction of that State.
Further, in the context of the immigration laws, the
federal courts have recognized that "residence" connotes
legal residence. Accordingly, it has been held that anyone
who enters this country illegally cannot thereby acquire
legal residence as a basis for an application for citizenship.
For example, in Schneider v. United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 65 F. Supp 227 (D.C. Wash., 1946),
the court held that the phrase "reside currently in the
United States" requires a lawful entry. In general, the cases
indicate that the lawful entry requirement in the immigra-
tion area is necessary if any rights other than due process
rights are to apply. The policy behind such a position would
appear to be that the courts are reluctant to confer greater
rights to a person, due to his unlawful entry, than those
rights he would have if he had not come to this country. In
1975, the Second Circuit in Burrafato v. United States
Department of State, 523 F. 2d 554 (1975), was confronted
with the problem of deciding how illegal entry affected the
rights of an alien to bring suit in the federal courts. The
court noted that the alien would have standing to sue if he
were in this country legally and then reasoned:
But he is not here legally. To give him rights due to
his unlawful presence greater than those he would
have if he had not entered the country, would be the
worst sort of bootstrapping and would encourage
aliens to enter this country surreptitiously.
In light of the legal entry requirement in the immigra-
tion area and the reluctance of the current Court to expand
cc.. in addition to being subject
to civil and criminal suits, illegal
aliens contribute to Texas's tax
base and provide its industries with
cheap labor."
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the fundamental interests and suspect classifications, the
Supreme Court may agree with a federal district court
which recently held that the "underlying rationale" of the
equal protection doctrine was intended to apply only "to
persons who have been admitted for permanent residence
under the immigration laws." That court noted that all
Supreme Court cases striking down alienage classifications
did so in the context of resident aliens who "are in many
respects like citizens," but, the court continued:
The philosophical and legal support for the [equal
protection) doctrine is completely absent where a
case involves a nonresident alien.... [Those] cases
simply stand for the proposition that all persons, ille-
gal aliens included, have basic constitutional rights.
They do not support the argument that the equal
protection doctrine protecting resident aliens has
relevance to nonresident aliens.
One recent Supreme Court case that indicates that the
Court may find the philosophical and legal support for the
equal protection clause to be absent in the context of illegal
aliens. seeking education is DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351
(1976). In that case a unanimous Court found that illegal
aliens "have no federal rights to employment." The Court
has long recognized the fundamental nature of the right to
work and its relationship to the equal protection clause. As
the Court wrote in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915):
It requires no argument to show that the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of a com-
munity is the very essence of the personal freedom
and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Four-
teenth] Amendment to secure.
If the equal protection clause does not secure illegal
aliens the fundamental right to work, it is doubtful that the
Court will find that it secures them the right to an educa-
tion-a right that Justice Powell indicated in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 711 U.S. 1, 35
(1973), was less than fundamental. The practical signifi-
cance of a holding that illegal aliens cannot secure a funda-
mental right by the equal protection clause may be that an
illegal alien cannot benefit by those guarantees at all. Such a
finding appears harsh, especially where the illegal aliens are
children whose lack of education will eliminate their
chances of escaping our lowest socio-economic strata. How-
ever, the Court must face the equal protection issue in
Plyler with its cognizance that "... the Fourteenth Amend-
ment embod[ies] a general policy that all persons laufully
in this country shall abide in any Itate on an equality of le-
gal privileges with all citizens under nondiscriminatory
laws .. .- In light of this underlying policy and the demon,
strated reluctance of the current Court to expand upon the
preferred rights that received the celebrated recognition of
the Warren Court, the harsh result appears likely. Such a
result would exclude aliens from the equal protection of our
laws, if their presence in this country is unlawful.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Powell has observed, Plyler v. Doe is indeed an
extraordinary case. Apart from the difficult question of con,
stitutional significance that it raises, it involves highly emo-
tional political issues. It is not hard to understand why the
public officials in Texas are alarmed by the drastic influx of
illegal aliens. Education is just one of several areas where
the illegal immigration problem has had an adverse eco-
nomic impact in that state.
On the other hand, as Justice Powell has noted, the
harm that will be occasioned by excluding the undocu-
mented children from the classroom needs no elucidation.
While all parties concede that the children are present in
this country illegally, no one contends that they have com,
mitted a moral wrong. The relegation of these innocent chil-
dren to a life of illiteracy and ignorance is certainly harsh
punishment. And, as recognized by the Supreme Court in
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972), that kind of treatment is clearly "contrary to the
basic concept in our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrong-
doing."
For the Supreme Court to decide that the illegal aliens
in Texas are not persons within the equal protection clause
would be putting form above substance. Such a decision
would fly in the face of the fact that Texas certainly con-
siders aliens to be persons within its jurisdiction when it
seeks to enforce its criminal laws, as well as Section 21.031
of the Education Code, against them. Moreover, in addi-
tion to being subject to civil and criminal suits, illegal aliens
contribute to Texas's tax base and provide its industries
with cheap labor. It would seem that Texas should not be
allowed to pick and choose between the times when it is to
its advantage to consider illegal aliens to be persons within
its jurisdiction and those when it would not be advanta-
geous.
But the courts have allowed these inconsistencies. For
example, in Federation for American Immigration Reform v.
Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 576-577 (D.D.C. 1980), the
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